2019); Stufflebeam v. Harris, 521 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. "If during an arrest excessive force is used, 'the ordinarily protected use of force by a police officer is transformed into a battery.'" The Supreme Court in Johnson further concluded that [a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the stop's duration. See Presley, 204 So. Because the legitimate and weighty concern of officer safety can only be addressed if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation[,] we believe that this interest outweighs the minimal intrusion on those few passengers who might prefer to leave the scene. Deputy Dunn also searched Plaintiff's wallet, took his identification, and entered his name into a computer. Once there is activity that raises any Terry issue, no problem with IDing passengers. 2018) should be of interest to law enforcement as to the limits of what an officer can demand of an individual. Id. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, [t]he touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 3d at 87. Text-Only Version. In sum, as stated in Brendlin, a traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will. Shuford v. Conway, 666 F. App'x 811, 816-17 (11th Cir. We have two convenient locations in North Central Florida: Allen Law Firm, P.A. He also had a valid basis to briefly detain both Plaintiff and his father who was driving the vehicle. Johnson v. An officer who makes an arrest without actual probable cause is still entitled to qualified immunity in a 1983 action if there was "arguable probable cause" for the arrest. Id. What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety. The First District then explained that the seminal case in Florida on passenger detentions during traffic stops is Wilson v. The Court noted the same interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the vehicle occupant is a driver or passenger: Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters. Count II: 1983 False Arrest - Fourth Amendment Claim. See id. "Supervisor liability arises only 'when the supervisor personally participates in the allege constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.'" 2010). at 1613. Free access for law students. Fla. July 10, 2008). The question in the case depended upon a determination whether the officers had the authority to require him to re-enter the house and to remain there while they conducted their search. Id. Id. . The Court explained that: Terry established the legitimacy of an investigatory stop in situations where [the police] may lack probable cause for an arrest. [392 U.S. at 24]. The officer has the authority to search your vehicle or person after a traffic stop. Such an arbitrary interference with the freedom of movement of one who is not suspected of any illegal activity whatsoever cannot be classified as a de minimis intrusion. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four corners of the complaint. We disapprove of the Fourth District's decision in Wilson v. State, and any cases that rely upon Wilson v. State for the proposition that law enforcement officers under the Fourth Amendment are precluded from detaining passengers for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop. The Supreme Court quoted Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), in support of its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to order passengers out of a vehicle: [In Summers,] the police had obtained a search warrant for contraband thought to be located in a residence, but when they arrived to execute the warrant they found Summers coming down the front steps. Moreover, "no Florida court has found probable cause to arrest a person for obstruction solely on the basis of a refusal to answer questions related to an ongoing investigation." See art. Passengers not suspected of any wrongdoing can be held and questioned by police during any traffic stop under Florida high court ruling. I then asked what for and the officer asked again.I then said I am not the driver and have violated no law.he then told me he can identify anybody in a vehicle and asked my name again.I refused he then opened my door pulled me out and cuffed me and and took my wallet out of my pocket and . 3d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). ( Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).) 6.. All rights reserved. "Alternatively, the causal connection may be established when a supervisor's custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so." Although Landeros and Stufflebeam arose under the laws of Arizona and Arkansas respectively, Florida would not follow a different approach because the ultimate source of authority on this issue is the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, not a specific provision of Florida law. In the US: Yes, an officer may ASK for a passenger's ID, but generally cannot REQUIRE a passenger to produce an ID. Based upon this analysis, the Supreme Court held that Brendlin was seized from the moment the vehicle stopped on the side of the road, and it was error for the trial court to conclude that seizure did not occur until the formal arrest. Deputy Dunn told Plaintiff that under Florida law, Plaintiff was required to identify himself, and that if he did not do so, Deputy Dunn would remove him from the vehicle and arrest him for resisting. Carroll was a Prohibition-era liquor case, . When Plaintiff asked why he was being arrested, Deputy Dunn stated that it was for resisting without violence by not giving his name when it was demanded. View Entire Chapter. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during his arrest, the Court finds that he cannot state a claim for relief because he was not a pretrial detainee at the time the arrest occurred. PDF. Plaintiff alleges 1983 violations against Deputy Dunn, including claims based on false arrest and due process. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069-71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Wilson, held that police officers can ask passengers to get out of a vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment. at 111. . The motion to dismiss is denied as to this ground. In Barr, two Pennsylvania State Troopers, in full uniform and in a marked vehicle, observed Barr's vehicle . Florida CAN and DOES require those who are performing certain licensed activities and are reasonably suspected of a violation of that licensing agreement to display and. at 231. Although Plaintiff generally alleges that the Sheriff owed him a "duty of care," the nature of the duty is vague and unclear. . The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that although Presley was detained, the limited nature and duration of the detention did not significantly interfere with his Fourth Amendment liberty interests. (quoting City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So. The case law establishes that in most situations a person's name and biographical information does not implicate their right against self-incrimination, so a suspect can be asked his name, date of birth, et cetera. Gainesville, FL 32611 Detention is permissible for this limited period of time because it allows law enforcement officers to safely do their jobaccomplishing the mission of the stopand not be at risk due to potential violence from passengers or other vehicles on the roadway. The only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision of the First District and hold that law enforcement officers may, as a matter of course, detain the passengers of a vehicle for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment.1, At the time of the events in this case, Gregory Presley was on drug offender probation. FLORIDA CRIMINAL CASE WORK HUSSEIN & WEBBER, PL. Deputy Dunn then conducted a pat-down search and placed Plaintiff in the back of a police car. The dissent also discussed the United States Supreme Court s opinion in Pennsylvania v. Officers John Pandak and Joshua Meurer subsequently responded to the scene based upon a request for backup due to a struggle occurring with the other passenger, who had exited the vehicle and attempted to leave. The officer verified that Brendlin was a parole violator with an outstanding no-bail arrest warrant and ordered Brendlin out of the vehicle. When analyzing a battery claim based on excessive force, a court considers "whether the amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstances." Indeed, as this case and Aguiar demonstrate, passengers need be wary of the risk of detention when choosing whether to ride in a car with a faulty taillight. Law enforcement officers in Florida must treat everyone fairly, regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin or religion. Does this same concept apply to a passenger in the vehicle in Florida? 7.. at 257-58 (some citations and footnote omitted). The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B) 901.151 Stop and Frisk Law.. Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a court "must accept [a] [p]laintiff's well pleaded facts as true, and construe the [c]omplaint in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff." at 24, the length of the traffic stop was reasonable, and subsequent United States Supreme Court precedent requires that we disapprove of Wilson v. State, 734 So. - Gainesville office. Id. At FindLaw.com, we pride ourselves on being the number one source of free legal information and resources on the web. at 411. If you have a case citation, such as 594 So. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff Marques A. Johnson filed his response in opposition. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. Plaintiff was taken to Pasco County Jail and charged with the misdemeanor crime of resisting without violence, a violation of 843.02, F.S. so "the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal," id., at 415. Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on the same basis. 2011)). Nothing occurred in this case that would have conveyed to Johnson that, prior to the frisk, the traffic stop had ended or that he was otherwise free to depart without police permission. Officer Trevizo surely was not constitutionally required to give Johnson an opportunity to depart the scene after he exited the vehicle without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting a dangerous person to get behind her. 3d at 88 (quoting Aguiar, 199 So. The First District noted that the Aguiar court concluded the analysis in Wilson v. State was flawed because it failed to give sufficient deference to officer safety. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. To demonstrate a policy or custom, "it is generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice; random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient." Count III is dismissed with prejudice, with no leave to amend. A recent case, Johnson v. Thibodaux City, 887 F.3d 726 (5 th Cir. Likewise, officers are permitted to inquire about the presence of weapons in the car in order to assist in protecting officer safety. XIV. (1) As used in this section, the term: (a) "Access device" means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other . Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03). While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion, we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. 3d at 192. Id. Police are also . 3d 448, 451 (Fla. 2016). ; English v. State, 191 So. Presley, 204 So. Thus, Maryland v. Wilson did not resolve the issue presented by this casethe detention of a passenger as a matter of course during a traffic stop. Online legal research platform providing access to case law from FL courts, as well as many other primary and secondary legal resources. During the search incident to arrest, Officer Pandak recovered a plastic bag containing powder cocaine from Presley's pocket. Id. 3:18-cv-594-J-39PDB, 2018 WL 2416236, at *4 (M.D. Name, address, and an explanation of the person's actions; In some cases it also includes the person's intended destination, the person's date of birth (Indiana and Ohio), or written identification if .